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Robert Z. Lawrence*
nited States wage performance has been dis-
quieting. Between 1979 and 1993, real
hourly compensation rose by just 5.5 per-
cent. This poor average wage performance
has been associated with a dramatic increase in the disper-
sion of earnings: both in the returns to general characteris-
tics such as education, experience, and occupation and in
earnings across workers with similar educational, experi-
ence, and occupational characteristics.1  Inthis paper I will
consider brieﬂy the evidence on the role that U.S. interna-
tional performance has played in these outcomes.
AVERAGE WAGES
Three internationally related explanations have been
advanced to account for the poor average growth in U.S.
wages over the 1980s. These can be described as deindus-
trialization, relative decline, and factor-price equalization.
But the evidence supports none of these explanations.
Instead, poor average compensation reﬂects the sluggish
rise in U.S. labor productivity, which results from poor
productivity performance outside the manufacturing
sector.
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION
The deindustrialization hypothesis suggests that the U.S.
trade deﬁcit in manufactured goods has eroded the supply
of highly paid manufacturing jobs. But the job content of
the U.S. manufacturing trade deﬁcit that emerged over the
1980s is simply too small to allow the explanation for slow
average wage growth to be the loss of high-paying manu-
facturing jobs due to trade. In 1991, the trade deﬁcit was
equal to about 5 percent of value-added in manufacturing.
Average hourly earnings in manufacturing were 8.2 per-
cent higher than those in the private sector generally.
(Average weekly earnings were 29 percent higher.) Since
manufacturing accounted for 17 percent of total employ-
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ment, shifting an additional (.05 * 17) 0.85 percent of
employment to manufacturing would have raised average
hourly and weekly wages by 0.07 and 0.25 percent, respec-
tively—an amount scarcely large enough to explain the
poor wage performance of the 1980s.
DECLINE
Nor is there support for the decline hypothesis. Stafford
and Johnson suggest that an erosion of the rents from U.S.
technological leadership explains the slow growth in U.S.
wages over this period. But such an erosion in the interna-
tional buying power of U.S. wages (and proﬁts) should be
associated with a decline in the terms of trade. However,
while there is evidence of such a decline in the 1970s, over
the 1980s, the broadest measure of the terms of trade—
using the GDP deﬂators for exports and imports of goods
and services—shows an improvement of 5.2 percent, while
the ﬁxed-weight price measures show an increase of 1.5
percent.
FACTOR PRICE EQUALIZATION
Finally, the claim of factor price equalization for all U.S.
wages put forward by Leamer (1991) also does not stand
scrutiny. U.S. compensation per worker actually increased
in line with output per worker. When nominal compensa-
tion is deﬂated by a production price index (in this case the
business sector GNP deﬂator) rather than by the consumer
price index, this “production wage” closely tracks the
growth in output per worker from 1979 to 1991. If the
factor price equalization between wages and capital was
occurring, real product wages would be growing more
slowly than productivity.2
The evidence instead indicates that had Ameri-
can workers chosen to consume the products they pro-
duced, their real compensation would have increased by
about 10 percent over the 1980s—about as much as out-
put per worker in the business sector. However, as elabo-
rated in Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), real wage growth
lagged behind productivity growth for two main reasons:
(a) much of the productivity growth occurred in industries
producing capital goods such as computers, which workers
do not generally buy, and (b) the relative price of housing
(which workers consume but do not produce) rose. Inter-
national trade played no role in this poor average wage
growth.
INCREASING DISPERSION
Other analysts have suggested that trade (or globalization)
helps explain the growing inequality in U.S. wages. In par-
ticular, they point to the correlation between rising wage
inequality and the growing U.S. trade deﬁcit (Murphy and
Welch 1992; Borjas and Ramey 1993). Many argue that
trade with developing countries is putting downward pres-
sure on the relative wages of unskilled workers.
QUANTITIES
Studies that have tried to quantify the relationships more
precisely, however, have generally concluded that the
impact of trade is small. In particular, Borjas, Freeman, and
Katz (1992, p.237) estimate the quantities of educated and
uneducated labor embodied in U.S. manufactured goods
exports and imports. They conclude that trade ﬂows
explain at most 15 percent (that is, 1.9 percentage points)
of the 12.4 percent increase between 1980 and 1988 in the
earnings differential between college-educated workers and
their high-school-educated counterparts. Since the trade
deﬁcit has declined considerably since 1988, a similar esti-
mate today would yield smaller effects.
U.S. imports from developing countries did
increase rapidly over the decade, but again what needs to
be borne in mind is the magnitude. In 1990, for example,
these imports amounted to $115.8 billion, or 2.1 percent
of U.S. GNP, versus 1.2 percent in 1981. It is hard to see
how a change of this magnitude—less than 1 percent of
GNP—could have a large impact on the overall labor mar-
ket.3 Jeffery Sachs and Howard Shatz (1994) estimate that
trade with developing countries reduced U.S. manufactur-
ing employment by 5.7 percent between 1978 and 1990—
a number that is just over 1 percent of aggregate U.S.
employment. They ﬁnd that such trade induced a 6.2 per-
cent decline in production worker employment in manu-
facturing and a 4.3 decline in nonproduction workers,
suggesting little impact on the economy-wide relative
demand for these two occupational categories.420 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995
PRICES
There is a problem in using ex post trade ﬂows to make
these calculations. Such ﬂows do not necessarily capture
the effect of price pressures that operate through trade.5 If
international competition forced U.S. workers to lower
their wages, for example, domestic ﬁrms might be able to
prevent imports from rising. By examining only trade
ﬂows, as these calculations do, we would conclude that
trade had no impact on wages. In principle, therefore, even
if trade ﬂows are small, changes in traded goods prices
could have large effects on the prices (and thus factor
returns) of domestically produced substitutes. As Bhagwati
(1991) has emphasized, relative price changes are the criti-
cal intervening variable in the chain of causation from
trade to factor prices.
If trade lowered the relative wages of unskilled
workers, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, we
would expect to see a decline in the relative price of goods
that are produced using unskilled labor relatively inten-
sively. In Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), however, my
coauthor and I ﬁnd that over the 1980s, the relative import
and export prices of unskilled-labor-intensive goods actu-
ally increased slightly.
As might have been anticipated given its surpris-
ing conclusions, our work has been attacked. Sachs and
Shatz (1994) raise questions about our use of the price data.
In particular, they argue that computer prices should not
be included in the sample. When they drop computers,
they obtain a negative but statistically insigniﬁcant rela-
tionship between import price changes and skill intensity
and they note that the size of the effect is small. Similarly,
if computer price changes are omitted, the ratio of manu-
facturing producer prices weighted by production worker
employment to prices weighted by nonproduction workers
falls slightly instead of rising slightly. While we would
agree that computer prices are difﬁcult to measure, we are
not convinced that this sector should be given no weight at
all in the explanation. Even accepting their evidence indi-
cates only a small relative decline in the prices of
unskilled-labor-intensive products.6
Moreover, in Lawrence (1994) I report similar
investigations of the price behavior of both German and
Japanese imports and producer prices. These data tell the
same story: when price changes over the decade of the
1980s are regressed against the ratio of unskilled to skilled
employment, they indicate a positive rather than negative
relationship (which is statistically signiﬁcant in the case of
wholesale prices but not import prices). Similarly, when
industry wholesale and import prices for both countries are
weighted by production worker shares, they show larger
increases (or smaller declines) than when weighted by non-
production workers. These results are robust to including
or dropping computer prices from the samples.
In Lawrence and Slaughter we also noted that if
trade was the operative factor, we would expect to see a
contraction in labor-intensive industries, but we would
also expect to see the remaining sectors taking advantage of
this labor by using unskilled labor relatively more inten-
sively. In fact, throughout U.S. manufacturing, there has
been a pervasive upward shift in the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor.7 Our conclusion, therefore, is that the sim-
ple Stolper-Samuelson process due to trade does not pro-
vide an adequate account of the growing wage inequality.
Instead, we interpret the evidence as consistent with a bias
in manufacturing technology toward the more intensive
use of skilled labor. Our conclusion is supported by Ber-
man, Bound, and Griliches (1992) and Bound and Johnson
(1992), who ﬁnd that trade played basically no role in
America’s wage changes in the 1980s and ascribe these
changes to technological change and changes in unmea-
sured labor quality.
Mishel and Bernstein (1994) question whether the
shift toward the relatively more intensive use of skilled
labor in the 1980s is any greater than it was in earlier
decades. In fact, the shift toward the more intensive use of
nonproduction labor in the 1980s was both larger and
more pervasive than in the 1970s and 1960s. As I elaborate
in Lawrence (1994), the average decrease in the ratio of
production to nonproduction workers across three-digit
industries was 18.47 percent in the 1980s, compared with
6.9 and 7.23 percent in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively.
Of course an increase in the manufacturing average could
reﬂect a change in either the mix of industries or the ratio
within industries. Both factors were at work. However,FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995 21
69.7 percent of the shift occurred within industries. Since
this shift occurred even though relative wages of nonpro-
duction workers actually increased, it is strongly sugges-
tive of a skilled-labor-using technological shift that was
concentrated in the skill-intensive sector of manufacturing.
EVIDENCE FROM U.S. MULTINATIONALS
Additional support for these conclusions can be found in an
examination of U.S. multinational data (Table 1) (Lawrence
1994). It is widely perceived in the United States that
many of the jobs formerly in these ﬁrms have moved
abroad. Drawn by low labor costs and low labor standards,
multinational corporations are seen as having relocated
their production toward low-wage countries. In particular,
the jobs of blue-collar workers are viewed as vulnerable to
this development. Such international outsourcing could, in
principle, provide an alternative explanation of the wide-
spread decline in both relative blue-collar wages and the
ratio of blue- to white-collar workers employed in U.S.
manufacturing.
If outsourcing is important, the decline in blue-
collar intensity in the United States should be associated
with an increase in blue-collar intensity abroad. In addi-
tion, as viewed through the eyes of the Stolper-Samuelson
paradigm, if developing countries lower their trade barriers
and increase their specialization in unskilled-labor-inten-
sive products, the relative wages of production workers
should rise in developing countries, while in developed
countries they should fall. On the other hand, if global
changes in technology are dominant, we should see parallel
increases in the ratio of blue- to white-collar employment
in the United States and in the rest of the world and simi-
lar movements in wages.
The ratio of production to nonproduction workers
employed in U.S. manufacturing operations worldwide has
fallen precipitously. Indeed, the declines are of similar mag-
nitude in U.S. manufacturing parents (-15.7 percent) and
in their afﬁliates in developing countries (-13.6 percent).
The declines have been particularly large in Europe (-24.2
percent) and in Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand
(-19.1 percent). In addition, the relative wages of produc-
tion workers have fallen worldwide—in U.S. subsidiaries
in both the developed and the developing economies. The
picture that emerges supports the notion of a common shift
in technology rather than the notion of expanding trade.
Worldwide (in both developed and developing countries), we
see a rise in the relative employment of nonproduction
workers despite the increase in their relative wage.8
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Mishel and Bernstein question whether this change in skill
intensity should be described as technological change.
They ﬁnd an absence of evidence indicating an association
with investment and other hard measures of technical
change such as research and development, capital accumu-
lation, and computerization, and they stress the impor-
tance of distinguishing developments in manufacturing
from those in the rest of the economy.
Both the points they make are important. First, if
this evidence is correct, those arguing for a major role for
technology must apply a broader interpretation that
includes new labor-management relations and work orga-
nization. Second, the divergent productivity performance
between the manufacturing and services sectors in the
United States is a major structural feature of the U.S.
economy in the 1980s. Historically, relative productivity
growth was faster in goods than in services. But this dif-
ference widened in the 1980s, when almost all the
improvement in total factor productivity in the business
sector was conﬁned to manufacturing (Gullickson 1988).
If the demand for manufacturing goods is inelastic, rela-
tively rapid increases in manufacturing productivity will
reduce the demand for manufactured goods workers. With
no bias in this change, since production workers are rela-
tively intensively employed in manufacturing, this will
reduce the demand for production workers. In combination
with a shift within manufacturing toward production-
worker-saving technical change concentrated in nonpro-
duction worker sectors, the impact on relative wages could
be considerable.
There remains the issue of whether technological
change itself has been affected by trade. It is noteworthy
that while U.S. productivity growth in manufacturing
recovered in the 1980s, it did not exceed the pace it had22 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995
achieved before 1973. This could reﬂect a spur from interna-
tional competition offsetting a more general slowdown, or it
could simply reﬂect a return to previous performance. More
a Labor force totals according to the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment, Hours, and Earnings, United States, 1909-90, vol. 1.
b Figures for private nonfarm establishments. The total nonfarm ﬁgures are:  1977–82.471 million; 1989–108.413 million.
c The compensation ratio for total U.S. employment is a comparison of the white-collar/blue-collar cost indices in 1977 and 1989, as published by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics.
d According to and based on U.S. Department of Commerce publications: 1977 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad; 1989 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. Information is for nonbank
U.S. parents of nonbank U.S. afﬁliates.
e Classiﬁed by industry of afﬁliate. According to the Department of Commerce publications referenced above.
U.S. MULTINATIONALS
Employment Figures (000s) Employment Ratios Compensation Ratios









   1977    1989
Percent
Change    1977    1989
Percent
Change    1977    1989
Percent
Change  1977  1989
Percent




Totalb 67,344 90,644 34.6 55,179 73,474 33.2 12,165 17,170 41.1 4.54 4.28 -5.7 - c - c -6.8
Manufacturing 19,682 19,426 -1.3 14,135 13,257 -6.2 5,547 6,169 11.2 2.55 2.15 -15.7 N.A. N.A. -
MULTINATIONALSd
Total 18,885 18.765 -0.6 N.A. N.A. - N.A. N.A. - N.A. N.A. - N.A. N.A. -





Developed countries 2,754 2,167 -21.3 1,695 1,196 -29.5 1,059 971 -8.3 1.60 1.23 -23.1 0.75 0.66 -10.8
Canada 562 455 -19.2 358 274 -23.5 204 181 -11.5 1.76 1.52 -13.6 0.86 0.81 -5.2
Europe 1,951 1,509 -22.6 1,202 828 -31.1 749 681 -9.1 1.60 1.22 -24.2 0.70 0.63 -10.0
Japan 40 75 86.6 14 23 62.0 26 52 99.7 0.53 0.43 -18.9 0.75 0.69 -8.5
Australia/New
Zealand/ S. Africa 201 129 -35.8 122 71 -41.3 80 58 -27.4 1.53 1.23 -19.1 0.78 0.68 -12.5
Developing countries 1,019 1,079 5.9 675 679 0.6 344 400 16.4 1.96 1.70 -13.6 0.47 0.41 -12.8





products 377 308 -18.5 248 184 -25.9 129 124 -4.2 1.93 1.49 -22.7 0.57 0.62 9.8
Textile products
& apparel 102 82 -19.5 80 59 -27.2 21 23 9.3 3.78 2.52 -33.3 0.47 0.59 23.7
Chemicals &
allied products 464 475 2.2 233 227 -2.5 231 247 6.9 1.01 0.92 -8.8 0.71 0.64 -9.1
Primary &
fabricated metals 229 179 -21.9 158 117 -26.1 71 62 -12.5 2.23 1.88 -15.6 0.80 0.73 -9.4
Machinery, except
electrical 523 508 -2.9 270 254 -6.0 253 254 0.4 1.07 1.00 -6.4 0.61 0.59 -3.9
Electric & electronic
equipment 629 455 -27.7 422 288 -31.8 207 167 -19.3 2.03 1.72 -15.5 0.56 0.54 -4.3
Transportation
equipment 740 597 -19.4 507 365 -28.0 233 231 -0.9 2.17 1.58 -27.3 0.97 0.61 -37.2
Other manufacturing 709 645 -9.0 452 382 -15.5 257 263 2.3 1.76 1.45 -17.4 0.75 0.59 -21.0
Total 3,773 3,247 -14.0 2,371 1,875 -20.9 1,403 1,371 -2.2 1.69 1.37 -19.1 0.68 0.59 -14.2
generally, however, the links between trade pressures and
productivity growth have not been adequately explored.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995 23
SPECIFIC FACTORS
Wages will reﬂect the returns to both general and ﬁrm-
and/or industry-speciﬁc human capital. Those invoking
theoretical frameworks such as that of Hecksher-Ohlin
implicitly have in mind explanations of changes in the
returns to general human capital. To argue, as we have
done, that there is little evidence in support of the
Hecksher-Ohlin framework, therefore, should not be inter-
preted to mean that trade has had no impact on the returns
to industry-speciﬁc capital. In fact, early work by Lawrence
and Lawrence (1985) and later work by Revenga (1992)
and Borjas and Ramey (1993) suggest that trade has had
some impact on relative industry rents.9 Thus, trade per-
formance has an impact on speciﬁc returns and rents but
the degree to which these effects are associated with more
general attributes remains unclear.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Why U.S. productivity growth in services has risen so
slowly since 1973 remains a great mystery. But taking this
performance as given, there is no mystery in the slow
growth in average U.S. compensation. A complete
accounting of the growing dispersion in U.S. wage perfor-
mance requires the integration of many different factors,
and the size of the changes suggests that a variety of causes
could be important. In this short note, however, I have
concentrated on the role of international trade and invest-
ment. I conclude that trade has had some impact on rela-
tive industry wages but provides little explanation for the
growing dispersion in the returns to general factors such as
education, skill, and occupation. Certainly, support for
those invoking the factor-price equalization theorem is
very weak.24 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995 NOTES
ENDNOTES
l. Bound and Johnson (1992) found that between 1979 and 1988, the
ratio of the average wage of a college graduate to the average wage of a
high school graduate rose by 15 percent. Steven Davis (1992) found that
between 1979 and 1987, the ratio of weekly earnings of males in their
forties to weekly earnings of males in their twenties rose by 25 percent.
The employment cost index indicates that between December 1979 and
December 1992, the growth of compensation and earnings of white-
collar occupations exceeded that of blue-collar occupations by 7.9 and
10.9 percent, respectively. Katz and Murphy (1992) and John, Murphy,
and Pierce (1993) emphasize the changes within industry-occupation
cells.
2. In addition to arguing that trade has reduced average U.S. wage rates,
Leamer (1991) argues that trade has lowered the relative wages of
unskilled workers. This claim will be discussed below.
3. U.S. exports to developing countries have also grown rapidly. Over the
1980s, the U.S. trade deficit in manufactured goods trade withdeveloping
countries swung by $45.55 billion or 8/10 of a percent of GDP.
4. Adrian Wood (1994) has questioned the use of developed country
input coefficients for imports from developing countries.
5. Deardorff and Staiger (1988) demonstrate the conditions under which
this methodology is appropriate. It is necessary that both preferences and
production technology are Cobb-Douglas.
6. Sachs and Shatz also claim on the basis of their regressions omitting
the computer industry that there was a negative relationship between
total factor productivity growth and skill intensity. They conclude “TFP
growth was less on average in high-skilled than low-skilled industries”
and argue that technological change was therefore causing wage
differentials to narrow rather than widen. Again, the impact of the
computer industry is important. In Lawrence and Slaughter, we found
that, including computers, the gap between weighted averages of high-
skilled and low-skilled productivity growth was positive, and thus
concluded the impact was the opposite.
8. Davis (1992) similarly rejects the prediction that relative factor prices
are converging internationally.
9. The international evidence is more mixed. Using an international
sample, Martins (1993) finds import penetration reduces relative wages
in competitive sectors such as textiles and clothing but actually increases
relative wages in sectors with product differentiation. Wyploz (1994)
obtains similarly complex results.
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